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In the Supreine Court 
of the State o~f Utah 
WILFRIED ROSSBERG and 
IVY ROSSBERG, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
LEONARD A. HOLESAPPLE 
and IRMA HOLESAPPLE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CASE No. 7802 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT O,F FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment declaring a note 
and its security to be null, void, and usurious, and an 
order cancelling the same. 
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Plaintiff Wilfried Rossberg is a salesman for Chris-
tensen Realty Company, owned and operated by Mr. 
Milton L. Christensen, a licensed real estate broker. 
In the course of his employment, prior to April 11, 
1951, Mr. Rossberg showed defendants a home at 965 
Atkin Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 4) On April 11, 
1951 the defendants, as buyers, and Jack H. Rohlfing 
and LaVon M. Rohlfing, his wife, as sellers, executed 
an Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement for the pur-
chase and sale of this home for a price of $16,500.00. 
(Exhibit A.) A $500.00 down payment was made and by 
the agreement defendants were to pay an additional 
$2000.00 on delivery of final eontract of sale which was 
to be on or before April 20, 1951. The balance was to be 
paid in monthly payments. At closing time (April 20, 
1951) defendants were unable to make the $2000.00 
payment, having been unable to obtain the money from 
relatives as planned. (R. 6) For this reason and the 
prospects of forfeiting the earnest money the defendants 
were quite disheartened. (R. 6) There was some talk of 
the defendant's brother buying the property, instead 
of the defendants, because he considered it to be a 
good buy. (R. 7, 36) Later defendants told Mr. Milton 
L. Christensen they couldn't go through with the deal 
because they couldn't raise the money. (R. 39) The 
closing date passed and defendants were still desirous 
of having the property. On the night of April 21, 
1951, upon the invitation of Mrs. Holesapple, Mr. Ross-
berg and Mr. Christensen stopped at defendants' home. 
Present, in addition to Mr. Christensen and Mr. Ros~-
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berg, was ~Irs. Holesapple. (R. 7, 8, 37) After some 
discussion of the problem of finance Mr. Rossberg indi-
cated he n1ight be able to obtain 1noney for them. (R. 8, 
37) No decision was made at this time but it was agreed 
the matter \Yould be discussed the next morning, Sun-
day, April 22, 1951. (R. 8, 51, 52) 
The next morning defendants requested Mr. Ross-
berg to see what he could do to obtain the money. (R. 8) 
He explained it would be necessary to obtain the money 
fron1 some other person, that he would have to go to 
Logan to contact his father-in-law. (R. 8, 9, 54) Mr. 
Holesapple testified that Mr. Rossberg indicated he was 
going to Logan to see his father-in-law and would try 
to get the necessary money. (R. 52) He understood that 
Mr. Rossberg was going to try and get the money by 
use of his (Rossberg's) credit. (R. 53) He also testi-
fied that he was told it would cost him $100.00. (R. 53) 
He said Mr. Christensen and Mr. Rossberg agreed to 
absorb this cost although both of these gentlemen deny 
it. (R. 29, 52) Mr. Rossberg testified he did go to Logan 
and obtained $1500.00 from a friend of his father-in-
law after his father-in-law had vouched for Mr. Ross-
berg's credit. (R. 9, 10) Mr. Rossberg agreed to repay 
to this gentleman $1500.00 plus interest at 6%. (R. 10) 
On the morning of April 23, 1951, he told defendants he 
had obtained the money and they indicated agreement. 
(R. 11) They informed the company they would be 
out that night to close the deal but they didn't come, 
(R. 11, 22). 
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Mr. Christensen and Mr. Rohlfing, the seller, testi-
fied that "three or four days" after the closing date 
two real estate contr:acts were signed by Mr. Rohlfing 
and wife, one of which was Exhibit B, bearing date of 
April 23, 1951. Both testified they were identical docu-
ments, except for the names of the buyers. (R. 32, 38) 
Exhibit B shows the defendants as buyers, while the 
other document showed the plaintiffs as buyers. At 
this signing it was agreed, and both testified, that Mr. 
Christensen was to give Holesapples the opportunity 
to purchase and if they did not then Mr. and Mrs. Ross-
berg were to purchase. ( R. 33, 43, 40) The length of time 
during which defendants could purchase was to be deter-
mined in Mr. Christensen's discretion. (R. 33, 40). He 
testified of a discussion with Mr. and Mrs. Holesapple 
wherein he advised of the seller's desire to close the 
deal and if they wanted to buy, the deal would be closed 
with them, but if they didn't want to buy, Mr. and 
Mrs. Rossberg would purchase. (R. 39) He was told 
by the Holesapples that as far as they were concerned 
they couldn't go through with it and inquired if they could 
have their money returned. Mr. Christensen agreed 
they could. (R. 39) After being advised the Holesapples 
could not go through with the deal, Mr. and Mrs. Rossberg 
signed the Real Estate Contract which had previously 
been signed by the sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Rohlfing. (R.14, 
41) Mr. Christensen and Mr. Rossberg each testified 
that Mr. Rossberg made a payment of $1250 pursuant 
to this contract. (R. 13, 19) This was further supported 
by Exhibit C, a check for $1250.00 payable to Christensen 
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Realty Co. Mr. Christensen testified that following this 
he informed defendants the home had been purchased 
by Mr. Rossberg and wife. (R. 41) 
The next day def,~ndants contacted Mr. Christensen 
and told him they would now like to buy the house 
if they could get the money from Mr. Rossberg. (R. 16, 
42) Mr. Christensen stated it was agreeable with him 
if agreeable with Mr. Rossberg. Later that day the 
defendants came in and signed Exhibit B, and the real 
estate contract previously signed by Mr. and Mrs. Ross-
berg was destroyed. ( R. 15, 42). 
At this time defendants also signed a 90-day note 
for $1600.00 as set forth in paragraph I of the complaint, 
and the assignment described in paragraph II of the 
complaint, assigning their contract interest to Ross-
bergs as security for the note. Plaintiffs were not pres-
ent at this signing. Plaintiffs had previously made avail-
able to defendants $1250.00 by releasing the payment 
made pursuant to the contract with Rohlfings, and 
$250.00 by check, total $1500.00. At the time of closing 
Mr. Holesapple understood Mr. and Mrs. Rossberg had 
purchased the property and that they were giving up 
whatever rights they had in the property in favor of the 
Holesa pple purchase. ( R. 53). In signing the note he 
did npt. intend to violate the law and had no knowledge 
of what constituted usury. (R. 54) He understood the 
note included a $100 fee for obtaining the money and 
he was agreeable to sign. ( R. 53) He testified he 
could do nothing else but sign because, "they had five 
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hundred dollars of my money", although he testified Mr. 
Christensen had offered his check back and told him he 
could have his money back on several occasions. (R. 53). 
Mr. Christensen testified the value of the property 
at the time of the sale was $1000.00 more than the sale 
price. ( R. 49). 
Upon defendants' failure to pay the note upon 
maturity plaintiffs brought action to require the sale 
of the security to satisfy the amount due 'and owing 
plaintiffs, and for a deficiency judgment if the security 
failed to satisfy the amount due and owing. Defend-
ants pleaded usury. This was the only issue in the 
trial court. 
The District Court found the note and assignment 
of security were executed and delivered by defendants 
to plaintiffs; that the note for $1600.00 was given in 
consideration of the payment of $1500.00 and that no 
further consideration whatsoever was given by plain-
tiffs to defendants for said note. The court found the 
note to be usurious and void and ordered that judgment 
be granted to defendants against plaintiffs for no cause 
of action and that the note and assignment were declared 
to be null, void, and usurious and ordered them canceled. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT No. 1. The decree holding the note and assigJI-
ment to be null and void and usurious cannot stand 
because there is no pleading, evidence, or finding of a 
corrupt intent, a necessary element of usury. 
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PoiNT No. 2. rrhe decree cannot stand because the 
evidence shows a. sale of plaintiff's credit rather than a 
loan of nwney frmn plaintiff, the latter being an essential 
element of usury. 
PoiNT ~ o. 3. The judgn1ent is faulty because the 
evidence fails to show an exaction of more interest than 
is allowed by law. 
POINT No. 4. The decree of the District Court should 
not be sustained because it defeats the announced pur-
pose of the usury statute. 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Since many factors are common to most of appel-
lants' points it seems advisable to set forth in a pre-
liminary statement the applicable statutes, the law on 
the construction of usury laws, burden and quantum of 
proof, and the necessary elements. of usury. 
STATUTES: 
The following are from Utah Code Annotated, 1943: 
'' 44-0-2. Maximum Rates. The parties to any 
contract may agree in writing for the payment of 
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, 
goods or things in action, not to exceed, excep·t 
as otherwise provided by law, ten per cent per 
annum;* • * .'' 
'' 44-0-6. Usury. Contracts Void. All bonds, 
bills, notes, assurances, conveyances, stocks, 
pledges, mortgages and deeds of trust, and all 
other contracts and securities whatsoever, where-
upon or whereby there shall be reserved or taken 
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·or secured, any greater sum or greater value for 
a loan or forbearance of any money, goods or 
things in action than is prescribed shall be void.'' 
'' 44-0-9. Usury. Restraining Action on U su-
urious Contract- Return of Securities. When-
ever it shall satisfactorily appear that any bond, 
bill, note, assurance, pledge, conveyance, mort-
gage, deed of trust, contract, security or other 
evidence of debt has been taken or received in 
violation of the provisions of this title, the court 
shall declare the same to be void, and enjoin any 
prosecution thereon, and shall order the same to 
be surrendered and canceled, and any property, 
real or personal, embraced within the terms of 
such contracts, and all securities, to be delivered 
up, is in possession of the defendant in the action; 
or, if the same -are in the possession of the plain-
tiff, provision shall be made in the judgment or 
decree in the action removing the cloud of such 
usurious contracts or securities from the title 
to ·such property. 
CoNSTRUCTION OF USURY LAws : 
The construction to be given these statutes has been 
clearly enunciated by this court in Cobb v. Hartenstein, 
47 Utah 174, 152 P. 424, in which the court adopted the 
following words from 39 Cyc. 917 as the rule in deter-
mining whether a given contract or transaction is tainted 
with usury: 
''Since usury laws are quasi penal, the courts 
will not hold a contract to be in violation of the 
usury laws, unless upon a fair and reasonable 
construction of all its terms, in view of the deal-
ings of the parties, it is manifest that the intent 
of the parties was to engage in such transaction 
10 
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as is forbidden by those laws. If two reasonable 
cop.structions are possible by one of which the 
contract will be legal and valid, while by the 
other it will be usurious and invalid, the court 
will always adopt the former. In short, the gen-
eral rule of interpretation and construction of 
such contracts may be said to be that the contract 
is not usurious when it may be explained on any 
other hypothesis.'' 
And from Rosenblum v. Gomall, et al., 52 Utah 206, 
173 P. 243: 
''In view of the drastic provisions of our 
statute the proof must be clear and convincing 
respecting the usurious character of the instru-
ment.''~ 
The Utah Court in Culmer Parint and Glass Co. v. 
Gleason, 42 Utah 344, 130 P. 66, in discussing our usury 
statute said: 
''This is a most drastic statute, since it for- \ 
feits the creditors entire claim. The statute au- \ 
thorizes more than confiscation for public use, \ 
since the debtor seems to be entirely relieved from · 
his obligation to pay, in case usury is established. 
Courts always abhor forfeitures, and this is espe-
cially true of courts of equity. Forfeitures, there-
fore, especially such as have the effect of taking 
prpperty from one and giving it to another, should 
be enforced only when the proof is clear and con-
vincing, if not beyond a reasonable doubt.'' 
"It is usually said that usury laws, penal in 
nature-that is, statutes which make the taking 
of illegal interest an offense and prescribe a 
penalty therefor-should be construed with rea-
sonable strictness." 55 Amer. Juris. 327. 
11 
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BuRDEN AND QuANTUM oF PROOF: 
The burden of proof is upon the party who alleges 
the usury to establish it by at least clear and convincing 
evidence and not merely by a preponderance thereof. 
Brown v. Johnson, 43 Utah 1, 134 P. 590. See also Van 
N oy v. Goldberg, 98 Cal. App. 604, 277 P. 538. 
"The burden of proving that a transaction is 
infected with usury lies upon him who attacks 
it, and that fact, it is held, must be established 
by clear and convincing evidence. Even though the 
law does not wholly avoid the contract, it has 
been held that the proof of usury must be clear 
an_9. satisfactory, and this would seem to be par-
ticularly true where the effect of usury is to 
render the contract void." 55 Amer. Juris. 437. 
The Utah Court in Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra, 
quoted with approval from Wood v. Babbitt, 149 Fed. 
822: 
"It is not enough that the circumstances 
proved render it highly probable that there is a 
corrupt bargain; such a bargain must be proved, 
and not left to conjecture." 
In the same case (Cobb v. Hartenstein) the court 
quoted from Lusk v. Smith, 71 Kans. 556, 81 P. 175: 
''Again, the existence of ,a usurious contract 
is never presumed. Where an agreement to pay 
interest is subject to two constructions, one of 
which would make it usurious, and the other not, 
t~~ court will adopt the latter * * * . The burden 
is upon the party seeking to impeach the trans-
action to show guilty intent, and that the contract 
was a cover for usury." 
12 
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The court further stated 1n Cobb v. Hartenstein, 
supra, at page 428 : 
''The courts also differ with respect to the 
quantum of proof that is required; some holding 
that the proof should be beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Under our statute the taking or receiving 
of a greater sum of money, or goods, or things 
in action of greater value than permitted by the 
statute for a loan or forbearance of money con-
stitutes, as we have seen, a misdemeanor and is 
punishable as such. In order to convict under 
the statute upon a criminal charge, no doubt, 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be re-
quired. Where the action, however, merely in-
volves civil liability, we think that proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt is not required; but the evi-
- dence must, nevertheless, be strong, clear, and 
convincing; that is, it must be of such a charac-
ter as to convince the understanding and satisfy 
the judgment of the court or jury. See Culmer, 
etc., Co. v. Gleason, 42 Utah 344, 130 P. 66; Brown 
v. Johnson, 43 Utah 3, 134 P. 590,46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
1157 ; Fisher v. Adamson, 151 P. 351. '' 
ELEMENTS OF USURY: 
The Utah Court has repeatedly affirmed its position 
as to the essential elements of usury. In Cobb v. Harten-
stein, supra, and Fisher v. Adamson, supra, the court 
quoted with approval a statement from 39 Cyc. 918: 
''In deciding whether any given transaction is 
usurious or not, the courts will disregard the 
form which it may take, and look only to the sub-
stance of the transaction, in order to determine 
whether all the requisites of usury are present. 
These requisites are: (1) An unlawful intent; 
13 
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(2) the subject matter must be money or money's 
equivalent; (3) a loan or forbearance; (4) the 
sum loaned must be absolutely, not contingently, 
repayable, and ( 5) there must be an exaction for 
the use of the loan of something in excess of what 
is 1allowed by law. If all of these requisites are 
found to be present, the transaction will be con-
demned as usurious, whatever form it may assume 
and despite any disguise it may wear. But if any 
one of these requisites is lacking, the transaction 
is not usurious although it may bear the outward 
m~rks of usury." 
To the same effect see 55 Am. Jur. 331; Teschcer v. 
Roome, 106 Or. 382, 212 P. 473. 
The appellants, with these matters in mind, now 
respectfully request consideration of their points. 
POINT NO. 1. 
THE DECREE HOLDING THE NOTE. AND ASSIGN-
MENT TO BE NULL AND VOID AND USURIOUS CANNOT 
STAND BECAUSE THERE IS NO PLEADING,-EVIDENCE, 
OR FINDING OF A CORRUPT INTENT, A NECESSARY 
ELEMENT OF USURY. 
The law in this state is very clear that a willful 
intent to violate the usury law is a necessary element 
of usury and must be proved and not left to conjecture. 
This doctrine is approved in Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra, 
Fisher v. Adamson, supra, Mathis et al. v. Holland Fur-
nace Co., 109 Utah 499, 166 P. (2) 518; Brown v. Johnson, 
43 Utah 1, 134 P. 590, 46 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1157, Ann. 
Cas. 1916C, 321. 
In Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra, the court said: 
'' * * * in order to establish usury, the existence 
14 
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of an unlawful or corrupt purpose is one of the 
essential elements which must be clearly proved 
to exist at the time of the contract or transaction 
which is claimed to be usurious is entered into. 
Where the contract upon its face is usurious, 
the intention may be inferred, and the inference 
may be so strong that no express denial can 
avoid the same. Where, however, as here, the 
contract is legitimate, * * * , but it is never-
theless contended that it is a mere shift, cloak, 
or cover for usury, then it requires substantial 
evidence of a corrupt or unlawful intent, or some 
fact or facts from which such an intention may 
be clearly inferred.'' 
To emphasize this point the court quoted from Bank 
v. Waggener, 9 Pet. 399, 9 L. Ed. 163, in which Mr. 
Justice Storey of the Kentucky Supreme Court said: 
"It must be proved that there was some cor-
rupt agreement or device, or shift, to cover usury, .J:-
OJ&l, that it was in the full contemplation of the -( j/ 
Pj!:!tie.s.." (Italics supplied by the Utah Court.) c .... \ 
The court in Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra, made it 
clear in the following language that usury is not made 
out even though it is apparent that more than the lawful 
rate of interest upon the contract was asked or received, 
and that such was in the full contemplation of the parties. 
"The mere fact that one may pay to another 
an excessive rate of interest pursuant to a con-' 
tract is not always sufficient to authorize a find-\ 
ing of usury. If that were so, every contract upon · 
which more than the amount permitted by the 
statute were paid would be usurious regardless 
of the intention of either the borrower or the 
lender. If that were the law the intention would 
15 
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cease to be an element in the law of usury. In 
order to constitute usury, as Mr. Justiee .Storey 
puts it, 'there must be a corrupt agreement', 
(
.lin addition to the payment of an excessive rate 
of interest." 
. 
If, for the sake of illustration, we concede that there 
was an excessive rate of interest in this case, where is 
the evidence that the parties fully contemplated a cor-
rupt agreement to violate the usury law, or a device 
or ·shift, to cover usury~ No such evidence was presented 
and there is no evidence from which it may be inferred. 
An unlawful intent may be inferred if a usurious inter-
est is apparent upon the face of the note or contract. 
T.~e note in thjs case is bona fide upon its face. This 
~Gb:1!::f t:fe t~:r::~e:n:=~tn~~:d~::~v:~r~:;:e~::. he judgment cannot stand since such intent, as we ave seen, is an essential element of usury in this state. 
POINT NO.2. 
THE DECREE CANNOT STAND BECAUSE THE EVI-
DENCE SHOWS A SALE OF PLAINTIFF'S CREDIT 
RATHER THAN A LOAN OF MONEY FROM PLAINTIFF, 
THE LATTER BEING AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF 
USURY. 
A careful examination of the facts reveals that the 
substance of the transaction between plaintiffs and dP.-
fendants was a sale of credit rather than a loan of 
money. In determining whether usury is present the 
courts look to the substance of the transaction rather 
than the form. See Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra, Fisher 
v. Adamson, supra, Mathis et al. v. Holland Furnace Co.: 
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s·upra, Brown v. J'ohnson, 8Upra. 
The defendants were unable to borrow money. (R. 
39) There were apparent attempts to borrow, but for 
some unnamed reason, presumably lack of security, 
poor credit, or otherwise, defendants' were unable to 
accomplish it. There was some discussion of defend-
ants' inability in this respect. (R. 7, 8, 37) In these 
discussions it was known that plaintiff had no money 
to loan, that he would have to travel to Logan to con-
tact third persons to attempt obtaining the money. (R. 
8, 9, 54) This was agreeable to defendants. Plaintiff 
testified and defendant stated he understood plaintiff 
would use his credit to obtain the money. (R. 54) 
Plaintiff obtained $1500.00 from a third person and 
agreed to pay 6% interest. At the time the note was 
signed· defendant understood it included a hundred dol-
lar fee for obtaining the money. (R. 53) A man's 
credit has monetary value. It is developed through 
years of fair dealings and is a commodity that can be 
rightfully sold. In this instance a reasonable fee was 
agreed upon for the sale of plaintiff's credit. 
The law is clear that a sale of credit is not within 
the usury Statute. See Seeman, et al. v. Philadelphia 
Warehouse Co., 47 Sup. Ct. 626; Oil City Motor Co. v. 
C.I.T. Corp., 76 F (2) 589; Title Guaranty and Swrety 
Co. v. Klein, 178 F. 689. 
55 Am. J ur. 343 provides : 
"It is well settled that the usury law is inap-
plicable to a transaction amounting merely to a 
loan or sale of credit, and a loan of money, to 
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facilitate which a loan of credit is made, is not 
rendered usurious by the payment of, or agree-
ment to pay, a sum exacted for the loan of the 
credit. However, it is difficult to lay down any 
general rule as to what amounts to a sale of 
credit as distinguished from a loan. Although the 
transaction must not be a mere cover for usury, 
and in the decision of this question the intent of 
the parties is important, generally speaking, con-
sideration must be given to the particular facts 
in order to determine whether one of the parties 
to the transaction is to advance the money, or 
whether the advance is to be made in the first 
instance by a third party." 
In this case it· is clear that the money in the first 
instance was advanced by a third party upon the credit 
of plaintiff. (R. 9, 10, 54.) A good discussion of this 
point is found in 104 A.L.R. 245. The following cases 
seem particularly applicable to this situation and sup-
port the general proposition: White v. Anderson, 164 
Mo. App. 132, 147 S.W. 1122; Palmer v. Jones, 23 
N.Y. S. 584. 
rhe present tr.ansaction be,ing in fact and in sub-
stance, a sale of credit, and a sale of credit not comi~~ 
within the usury law, it follows that usury has not 
been established. 
POINT NO.3. 
THE JUDGMENT IS FAULTY BECAUSE THE EVI-
DENCE FAILS TO SHOW AN EXACTION OF MORE INTER-
EST THAN IS ALLOWED BY LAW. 
The fact that the amount of a note exceeds the sum 
actually loaned by a sum greater than the interest 
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charge sanctioned by the statute does not conclusively 
establish an intent to transgress its terms. Atlas Realty 
Corp. v. House, 132 Conn. 94, 192 A. 564. 
In the case of Fisher v. Adamson, supra, the Utah 
Court laid down the rule that :a charge for services 
rendered, in connection with obtaining the loan, in addi-
tion to the highest rate of interest upon the money 
loaned, does not render the transaction usurious. In 
that case a note was given providing for payment of 
$300.00 in 60 days without interest to maturity and the 
maximum legal rate of interest ,after maturity. The 
lender paid the borrower $290.00, he having deducted 
$10.00 for services rendered in looking up the security. 
The court adopted the following statement from 39 
Cyc. 981: 
"The circumstances attendant upon the mak-
ing of a loan may require many kinds of services 
to be rendered to the borrower by the lender or 
his agent. For such services rendered in good 
faith the lender may properly require of the 
borrower a reasonable compensation in addition 
to the highest legal rate of interest upon the 
money loaned. Nor will an honest agreement 
for such compensation render the loan illegal, 
even though service rendered may be such as 
the lender would ordinarily perform in his own 
interest.'' 
The Restatement of Contracts, Section 533, and 
Williston on Contracts, Vol. 6, Section 1694, Page 4792, 
are to the same effect. 
Conceding, for the sake of argument only, that a 
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loan by plaintiff is involved, let us look to the substance 
of this transaction to see what compensation might be 
allowed for services rendered and other credits before 
a computation of interest is made. 
The testimony indicated that pl~aintiff made a trip 
to Logan to obtain the money. The expense consisted 
of gasoline and oil, wear and tear upon plaintiff's auto-
mobile, meals, plaintiff's time and services, and what 
plaintiff termed his "reputation", obviously a refer-
ence to his credit. (R. 23, 24). No monetary amount 
was placed upon these items, except gasoline, but for 
the purpose of illustration to show the expenses were 
not unreasonable we m~ake the following comments. The 
distance from Salt Lake to Logan and return is 170 
miles, and it is not unreasonable that plaintiff traveled 
10 miles in addition. Eight cents per mile is a common 
rate paid by several companies. Testimony indicated 
the trip was made on a Sunday, considered the best day 
of the week for real estate business. A charge of $45.00 
for plaintiff's time and service would not be unreason-
able. Plaintiff agreed to pay interest of 6% to the third 
party from whom he obtained the money. To determine 
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CASH AND SERVICES 
Travel (Salt Lake, Logan, vicinity 
and return) 180 mi. @ .08 ................ $ 14.40 
Meals ........................................................ 4.00 
Plaintiff's time and services.................. 45.00 
Interest to third party............................ 22.50 
Cash paid for defendants' benefit ........ 1500.00 
ToTAL CAsH AND SERVICES.............................. 1585.90 
Maximum allowable interest................ 39.75 
TOTAL CHARGE PERMITTED UNDER LAW ........ $1625.65 
ToTAL AMouNT OF NoTE (including 
interest for 3 mo.) --··················-····-·---$1624.00 
Although the burden is upon defendants to show usury, j 
the presumption being there is no usury, it is obvious 1 
from the above that the total charge of $100.00 was not1 
unreasonable for plaintiff's expenses and services. 
Uncontroverted evidence was presented that de-
f~ndants were in default on the contract to purchase 
the property, and thereafter that plaintiffs signed an 
agreement with the seller of the property, and, in fact, 
made payment of $1250.00 towards such purchase. De-
fendants understood that plaintiffs had acquired an 
interest in the property and were giving it up. The 
respective rights of plaintiffs and defendants in the 
property when plaintiffs had signed the uniform real 
estate contract, it is true, were not litigated. The saving 
of a possible loss of defendants' earnest money is ,a 
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factor that should be considered not only in determin. 
ing the advantage to the borrower but to show the good 
intention of the plaintiffs. It is suggested that the 
settlement of a claim which might be a cloud upon a 
title (Plaintiff's rights in the property) is entirely 
proper. Testimony was given that the property had a 
market value of $1000.00 above the selling price (R. 49) 
Since plaintiffs were going to have a one-half interest in 
the property a credit of $500.00 might be given. If this 
is added to the above figure of $1625.65 making a total 
of $2125.65 it is difficult to see how an agreement to 
pay $1624.00 would be usurious. 
POINT NO.4. 
THE DECREE OF THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD 
NOT BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE IT DEFEATS THE AN· 
NOUNCED PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE. 
The purpose of usury statutes is set forth in 
Rospigliosi v. Glenallen Mining Company, 69 Utah 41, 
252 P. 276: 
"It is, however, ~argued by appellants that, 
by reason of the language of our statute, the 
r~egislature not only intended to protect the bor-
/ · rower, as do the statutes of many other states, 
1 but that the legislative intent was also to penal-
\_ ize the lender by providing for the forfeiture of 
not only the interest but of the debt itself, and 
also by making the lender contracting for usurious 
interest guilty of a misdemeanor. Granting that 
the language of the statute is drastic, nevertheless 
the primary purpose and object of the law re-
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mains. That object, as agreed by ~all the courts 
under the statutes as comprehensive as ours, is 
not the punish1nent of the lender but the protec-
tion of the borrower. That conceded purpose of 
the Legislature, as stated by the Supreme Court 
of "\Visconsin, enters into, and to a very large 
extent controls, the interpretation of the stat-
utes, and the courts have so been influenced in 
tqe construction of these laws. It is true that it 
is the duty of courts to enforce the plain intent 
of the statute when the parties entitled to the 
benefit of the statute ask for its protection. Courts 
do not, however, and ought not, so interpret a 
legislative act that the property of one citizen is 
forfeited and lost to another, unless the plain 
and unequivocal mandate of the Legislature 
admits of no other rational construction.'' 
Defendant testified that he borrowed the money be-
cause they (Christensen Realty) had $500.00 of his 
money. He admitted, however, that he was told the 
money would be refunded to him without loss if he 
wanted it. This was not a situation, therefore, in which 
defendants were at the mercy of the plaintiffs. 
If the lower court's decision is allowed to stand ' 
it will result in the taking of property from the plaintiffs 
and awarding the same to the defendants. Such a re-
sult would exceed the announced purpose of the usury 
law, that of protecting the borrower, by depriving plain-
tiffs of property and awarding it to defendants. Such 
a policy we submit is not in the public interest. A bor-
rower with the secret intention of enriching himself can 
do so by negoti~ating a loan with interest in excess of 
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that allowed by law. What was intended as a shield 
becomes a sword under such doctrine. 
In the words of Mr. Justice Frick, in Cobb v. Har-
tenstein, supra : 
''To enforce a judgment under such circum-
stances would be to perpetvate a wrong, not to 
vindicate one. '' 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants contend that usury was not proved in the 
trial court. Three essential elements are lacking, namely: 
1. A corrupt intent to violate the usury law; 
2. A loan of money by plaintiffs to defendants; and 
3. The exaction of more interest than is allowed by 
law. 
To sustain the lower court would be going against 
the law as heretofore announced by the Supreme Court. 
Appellants respectfully urge the Court to reverse 
the judgment of the trial court and grant the relief 
prayed for in their complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN F ARR LARSON, 
.Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and .Appellants. 
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